Home-based Internet of Things (IoT) devices have gained in popularity and many households became "smart" by using devices such as smart sensors, locks, and voice-based assistants. Given the limitations of existing authentication techniques, we explore new opportunities for user authentication in smart home environments. Specifically, we design a novel authentication method in IoT-enabled smart homes. We perform initial experiments and a user study leveraging network traffic collected from 8 IoT devices in our university lab. Preliminary results show that our LSTM model achieves a maximum accuracy of 75% in identifying users.
INTRODUCTION
As the extent of technology in our lives increases with the widespread use of Internet-connected devices, user authentication remains an important issue to investigate. Password-based techniques are the de-facto standard method of authentication, but their limitations are well known: users tend to select weak passwords and re-use passwords across accounts. Hardware tokens and biometric authentication are alternatives, but they also have limitations related to usability and difficulty of revocation. Behavior-based authentication models have been proposed to improve the security and usability of authentication. Freeman et al. [3] designed a machine learning (ML) approach for clustering logins into normal and suspicious based on their IP, geolocation, browser, and time of day. Implicit authentication [8] shows the applicability of behavior modeling for authentication by utilizing the call/message information, browser activity, and GPS history. Riva et al. proposed Progressive Authentication [7] for modeling user behavior on mobile devices by combining biometric features and sensor data to score user authenticity before asking for a PIN. Most of these works focus on authenticating users on mobile devices using the data generated and collected locally on the mobile device.
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In this work, we propose a novel method of user authentication in smart homes, which could be used in the following scenarios:
• Scenario 1: Smart devices in a household can identify users and give them access to sensitive information (e.g. allowing them to purchase items using voice assistants or change smart lock settings).
• Scenario 2: The behavioral model can be used as an additional factor in another authentication scheme for mobile or PC login in addition to standard credentials. We set up infrastructure for network traffic collection from a variety of IoT devices installed in the Mon(IoT)R Lab [1] at Northeastern University. We conducted two different sets of experiments to confirm that user behavior can be inferred from network traffic. First, in a controlled experiment, we ran 9 Alexa skills in Amazon Echo Dot and built a multi-class skill classifier that can identify which skill is used. The initial results show 65% accuracy for an LSTM model applied to sequential packet data. Second, we conducted an IRB-approved user study at our lab. We recruited 4 users who used the lab over multiple sessions and interacted with the IoT devices simulating their home environment. We collected the network data generated from 8 selected devices and built classifiers with different representations and time windows. Our initial results show that an LSTM model using aggregated data collected over 20 minutes can identify the person in the room with 75% accuracy.
METHODOLOGY
Our approach is based on the insight that the network activity of IoT devices and the sequential order of network packets contains valuable information about a user's action and behavior. Most IoT devices use HTTPS for network communication to provide security and privacy. Similar to the work of Miller et al. [6] , we show that users actions can be revealed only from packet header information, Figure 1 : Architecture diagram of the data-flow and proposed authentication process without analyzing the payload. To protect user privacy, we choose not to fetch payload information from packets even when it is available (Wemo Switch and Philips Hub communicate over HTTP). Figure 1 gives an overview of our system architecture. We collect data from 8 IoT devices representative of a smart home environment. We represent data using numerical features and train two LSTM classifiers: one identifies Alexa skills and the other identifies the user in the room. We use two different feature representations: individual packet level, and aggregated for each time interval (we vary the length of time interval between 5 and 60 seconds). The models are trained using network traffic that is captured and labeled with either the Alexa skill or the user in the room. In the prediction task, we apply both models on new data and generate a prediction for either the Alexa skill or the user in the room. The prediction or authentication score generated by our ML models can be given as input to either: (1) a local device that performs sensitive actions (e.g. a voice assistant performing payment on behalf of the user) or (2) a remote service asking for additional authentication (e.g. a cloud service or social network).
Threat model. For Scenario 1, in which IoT devices authenticate users, anyone in close proximity to the target device could potentially act adversarily. For instance, users might like to prevent their kids from making purchases using Alexa, or visitors from changing the smoke detector settings.
For Scenario 2, the adversary could be an intruder or someone with legitimate access to the household devices. We assume that in the worst case, the attacker knows the user's credentials or the credentials are saved in the user's personal device. The attacker is motivated to bypass authentication to perform financial transactions or other harmful actions.
We envision that data collection and the authentication module reside in a trusted device, like the home router or a desktop. We protect user privacy, as the network data never leaves the home.
Data collection. We collected pcap data from 8 IoT devices in the Mon(IoT)R Lab at Northeastern University: Philips Hub, Behmor Coffee Maker, Smarter iKettle, Roku TV, Google Home, Amazon Echo Spot, and two Amazon Echo Dots. For the Alexa skill classifier, we picked 9 different skills (CNBC News, Fireplace Sounds, Today in History, Routers News, Spotify, asking about the weather, asking WSJ for a market update, and asking for a joke) and collected a total of 225 sessions automatically labeled with the associated skill. For user identification, we performed an IRB-approved user study with 4 users over two weeks. They entered the room alone, and logged their entering and exiting times separately in order to label the data. In total, each of the 4 users had 5, 4, 4, and 7 sessions in the room, with lengths of 126, 102, 138, and 161 minutes, respectively. We divided each user session into multiple data samples based on fixed-size time windows to classify the user in each window.
Feature extraction. In order to generate suitable representations of network traffic for ML classification, we used two different feature representations.
. . .
Packet Sequence Representation: A sample is a sequence of feature vectors (see (1)) extracted from each individual packet. We extracted the following features: time, domain, direction, length, source port, destination port, protocol, device name per packet. Thus F i1 , . . . , F id are the d = 8 features for packet i. We generated a sequence of packets for a fixed time interval (e.g. 1 minute). Parameter n is the length of the sequence and is fixed in advance. We trimmed longer sequences and padded shorter sequences with zero vectors. The label of the entire sequence is either an Alexa skill or a user.
Aggregated Sequence Representation: A sample in this representation is a sequence of aggregated features for a fixed aggregation interval (of size w seconds). In matrix (1), F i j represents aggregated feature j for time interval i in the window. The length of the entire sequence is n, covering a time window of size wn. For example, if we use aggregation intervals of size w = 10 seconds and sequence length n = 10, the time window for a sequence is 100 seconds. As aggregated features, we used the total amount of data exchanged in both directions for the 8 devices (8 features), and the total amount of data exchanged and packet count for each domain visited in network traffic (282 features in total).
Supervised learning. We used the labeled sequences of size n as input into a sequential learning supervised model. We chose Long Short Term Memory (LSTM) [5] , a well-known model for sequential learning that performs very well in tasks related to language modeling and speech recognition. For all our experiments, we performed 4-fold cross-validation with stratified folds, choosing 75% of data for training and 25% for testing.
EXPERIMENTAL EVALUATION
First, we present the experimental results on the Alexa skill classifier, and then on user authentication.
Alexa Skill Classifier
To determine if we can detect more fine-grained information about user activity, we performed an experiment to classify Alexa skills. Using a script that reads a manually written set of commands in random order, we generated a dataset consisting of 225 samples for 9 different commands that correspond to the 9 skills of interest. Due to the synthesized audio causing Alexa to fail to understand the task, we removed 25 samples that timed out or did not generate useful traffic. In total, we collected 404,418 packets over 200 minutes. Figure 2 shows the traffic rates per second for different skills and clearly demonstrates distinct traffic patterns per skill. Jeopardy and Curiosity skills have data exchange across multiple time intervals since they are interactive, whereas News and Music have noticeably more data exchange at the beginning of the interaction. Using the packet sequence representation described in 2, we trained an LSTM Alexa skill classifier to predict among 9 classes. In our initial results we achieved skill prediction accuracy of 65% (or 5.85 times higher than the random guessing probability of 11.11%).
User Authentication
For our user authentication task, we collected a total of 525 minutes of data and 1,740,327 packets labeled with the 4 users. We divided the data into training and testing, splitting the packets by time within a session. We used both feature representations described in Section 2. First, setting the time window to 1 minute, we performed experiments with an LSTM model using the packet sequence representation. In this case, we obtained around 50% accuracy for predicting the user. Since generating a feature vector for each packet in our model is resource intensive, we experimented with aggregated features using different intervals and sequence Our maximum prediction accuracy is 75% and it shows promising results for identifying users.
